Secondary considerations of nonobviousness

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Is your examiner repeatedly insisting that your patent application claims are obvious?  One option: “reboot” your examiner by submitting at least one Rule 132 declaration providing “secondary considerations of nonobviousness”.

 Obviousness rejections are needed to prevent trivial patents.  Obviousness is legally determined by considering if the invention would be obvious from the standpoint of an imaginary Person Having Ordinary Skill In The Art (PHOSITA). This is ultimately just legal guesswork, and as previously discussed, such determinations are often unduly influenced by hindsight bias.

There is an alternative mechanism. The patent legal system also allows applicants to rebut obviousness rejections by submitting “objective indicia of nonobviousness”, which we will call “outside evidence”. This outside evidence can include unexpected results, commercial success, long-unsolved needs, failure of others, professional approval, skepticism of experts, and the like.

Although allowed, such outside evidence has a rather second-class status.  You can even see this in the terminology: “secondary considerations of nonobviousness”.  The patent legal system actually prefers its imaginary PHOSITA reasoning over actual real-world evidence! Sounds silly, but remember that they are skeptical because applicants are constantly trying to game the system.

Submission of outside evidence is not done often.  You might think that with the 2007 KSR removal of anti-hindsight rules, it would be more frequently used, but it isn’t. However, in my opinion, it is a useful “in an emergency, break glass” kind of tool.  You use it when you want to try to break the examiner out of a mental “rut”, or even a mental “infinite loop” of obviousness rejections.

When to use it?  Obviousness rejections are routine.  It usually takes at least two office actions to see if the examiner is showing signs of having a non-negotiable “I still think it’s obvious” position.  If this seems to be the case, outside evidence can potentially be used to try to “reboot” the examiner and break out of the loop. This is because according to the USPTO examination rules MPEP 716.01(d)   Weighing Objective Evidence…“When an applicant timely submits [outside] evidence traversing a rejection, the examiner must reconsider the patentability of the claimed invention.”

Outside evidence is submitted as various “Rule 132 declarations”.  Here the identity and the credentials of an outside declarant (someone other than the attorney, and preferably other than the applicant) are presented, the relevant outside facts are given, and the declaration is signed by the declarant. It is important to try to find credible individuals for this and to submit the best evidence available.

Due to USPTO concerns that the outside evidence is unreliable, this is not a sure tactic.  The rules state that there must be a “clear nexus” between the outside evidence and the invention’s claims. The examiner may rebut by arguing that no such clear nexus exists, proposing alternative explanations, and/or looking for other ways to discount the declaration.  Still, if you do have good evidence, why not use it?

Obviousness, hindsight, KSR

Training the human neural network: by Novasdid (CC BY-SA 4.0)

The 2007 KSR v. Teleflex Supreme Court (SCOTUS) decision is why the patent examiner, ignoring hindsight issues, just used your own teaching against you to reject your patent application claims as being “unpatentable” (obvious) under 35 USC 103.  Unfortunately, the US patent “obviousness” rules and regulations still have some “bugs”. 

The patent examiner has just reviewed your patent application, and has sent you a response. What are all these “rejected under 35 USC 103 as being unpatentable over (various citations)” statements? It almost looks like the examiner just copied your claim, interspersed it with various citations matching some of the claim words, and concluded with “therefore it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art…

This might even look to you like a standard formula that could be used to reject almost anything. Why does the USPTO work this way?

Some background: Without obviousness rejections, your patent could soon be swamped by many other competitor patents that claim the smallest, most trivial changes to your work. To keep the patent system healthy, there needs to be some “shielding”, some sort of “force field” that keeps competitors from getting too close to your work. In the US, the depth of the “shielding” or “force field” is set by trying to legally determine, often years later, what a person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) would think was obvious.

The big problem is “hindsight bias”. Lots of non-obvious things look obvious in hindsight. Here the legal system is attempting to cope, with varying success, with a very complex underlying problem of pattern recognition. Once you see the solution to a puzzle, it is hard to see anything else.

Prior to 2007, the USPTO used anti-hindsight rules in an attempt to minimize hindsight problems. However, in the 2007 KSR v. Teleflex case, SCOTUS made what, in my opinion, was a key error. Dictionaries define hindsight somewhat incompletely as: “understanding of a situation or event only after it has happened or developed”. SCOTUS ran this incomplete dictionary definition into the ground. They argued that the earlier anti-hindsight rules were too “rigid”, and that “common sense” should be used. They held that hindsight could be avoided by just considering if the invention would be obvious “at the time of the invention”.

This is an almost meaningless statement.  Who would file a patent application if it could be invalidated by later filed patent applications?

In reality, the patent applicant has just shown the examiner the solution to a puzzle, thus “training the examiner’s neural net” to subsequently view this solution as “obvious”.  However, the examiner is told to examine with 100% hindsight bias.  The examiner can also dismiss “hindsight” rebuttals by merely stating that under the newer, post-KSR, USPTO rules (MPEP 2141.01 III): “Content of the prior art is determined at the time the invention was made to avoid hindsight.”

In other words, thanks to the KSR ruling, the present USPTO rules can be paraphrased as Don’t bother us about “hindsight”, we’re not listening, and SCOTUS says that we don’t have to!

Fortunately, there are other ways to rebut obviousness rejections. Examiners often misquote the citations, have gaps in their reasoning, and their proposed combination is often a Frankenstein monster that differs significantly from the claim.  Secondary considerations can also be raised. So things can be done, but this hindsight “bug” (or feature) in US obviousness patent law is annoying.

USPTO office actions

USPTO office actions
USPTO office actions

USPTO office actions are used to reject most patent applications by using “done before”, “obvious”, “vague”, or “not patent eligible” type arguments.

Although we all hope that a patent application will sail through the USPTO patent examination process and be allowed “as is”, this usually doesn’t occur.  As a practical matter, examiners work on a quota system. The net effect of this quota or “count” system is that the average successful patent is usually rejected several times before it is allowed.

Typically an examiner will first read the patent claims, and search for various citations (often earlier filed patent applications) that match certain claim key-words.  The examiner will then write a 20-40+ page “office action” document that rejects your various claims for various reasons, and send it to the correspondence contact of record.  The examiner expects you to respond within three months by submitting a written “office action response” that rebuts these various rejections.

The most “popular” USPTO rejections are:

Done before – 35 USC 102: The examiner thinks he has found another single citation that teaches everything in your particular claim. However absent actual copying, no two patents are usually totally alike. This type of rejection can often be rebutted by explaining where the citation is different, or amending the claims to add additional detail that differs from the citation.

Obvious – 35 USC 103:  The examiner (sometimes impermissibly guided by your disclosure) is attempting to reject your claim by combining features from multiple citations. The examiner may often create a Frankenstein concept that may or may not be plausible. Fortunately, there are examination rules here. Often this type of rejection can be rebutted by any of 1) showing that the examiner is misquoting the citations, 2) amending your claims, 3) showing which “103” examination rules were broken.

Vague – 35 USC 112:  This “vagueness” or “indefinite” type rejection is used for different things. Sometimes it is harmless and easily corrected, such as when the claim’s grammar is off. Sometimes it is deadly, such as when your underlying patent application doesn’t teach how your invention works in adequate detail.  This is more likely to happen if the original application lacks specific examples.  Although this can often be rebutted or fixed by changing the claims, sometimes the only way to attempt to fix this is to file a “continuation in part” application that adds the missing detail.

Not eligible – 35 USC 101:  In the old days (i.e. before 2015), this was a rarely used rejection because the 35 USC 101 law was written to be very expansive. However, recent court decisions have made this area quite a swamp, and this is still being sorted out. In the meantime, realize that business methods and financial methods have a higher than average rejection risk.

Cleaning up obsolete case law: time to revisit In re Gorman

Spiderweb
Spiderweb

35 USC 103 rejections: Ever have something rejected as “obvious” in view of a combination of 5+ references?  The re Gorman case is how such absurd rejections are rationalized.

According to MPEP 707 section 7.37.07, arguments that the examiner used an excessive number of citations are presently found to be “unpersuasive”.  Section 7.37.07 is based upon an old case In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 18 USPQ2d 1885 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  However Gorman uses reasoning that is now obsolete and unsupported due to patent law developments since 1991.

Some key aspects of the re Gorman decision were:

When it is necessary to select elements of various teachings in order to form the claimed invention, we ascertain whether there is any suggestion or motivation in the prior art to make the selection made by the applicant. Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1143, 227 USPQ 543, 551 (Fed.Cir.1985). ” ‘Obviousness can not be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention, absent some teaching, suggestion or incentive supporting the combination.’ ” In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 834, 15 USPQ2d 1566, 1568 (Fed.Cir.1990) (quoting Carella v. Starlight Archery and Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 140, 231 USPQ 644, 647 (Fed.Cir.1986)).

The extent to which such suggestion must be explicit in, or may be fairly inferred from, the references, is decided on the facts of each case, in light of the prior art and its relationship to the applicant’s invention. As in all determinations under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 103, the decisionmaker must bring judgment to bear. It is impermissible, however, simply to engage in a hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention, using the applicant’s structure as a template and selecting elements from references to fill the gaps. Interconnect Planning, 774 F.2d at 1143, 227 USPQ at 551. The references themselves must provide some teaching whereby the applicant’s combination would have been obvious

However since 2007 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, the “teaching, suggestion or incentive” requirement for combining citations is no longer required (although still allowed).  When this part of the 1991 Gorman court’s reasoning, shown in the first paragraph above, is removed, it becomes clear that the legal and logical underpinning of their 1991 decision no longer apply!

However under present rules, MPEP 707 section 7.37.07, based upon the now obsolete 1991 Gorman legal reasoning, still acts as a roadblock for any applicant who attempts to argue that the examiner did:  “engage in a hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention, using the applicant’s structure as a template and selecting elements from references to fill the gaps.”

Given that the Gorman court’s assumptions no longer hold, isn’t it time to revisit this case?  At present, there is no upper limit to the number of citations that an examiner can apply, and indeed I personally have seen combinations of eight citations used in obviousness rejections.